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THE SEC ADDS A NEW WEAPON:
HOW DOES THE NEW ADMISSION
REQUIREMENT CHANGE THE LANDSCAPE?
Paul Radvany*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (the “SEC”) has settled the vast majority of the cases it has
brought.1  By settling cases, the SEC is able to obtain enhanced
cooperation from defendants, maximize its resources, and avoid
the risks associated with taking a case to trial.2  Defendants benefit
from settlement as well, because they can limit litigation risks and
“mitigate[e] . . . any real reputational harm for either the corpora-
tions or individuals involved.”3  Before 2013, the SEC had a “long-
standing policy” of settling cases without requiring admissions or
permitting defendants to deny the allegations brought by the SEC,4
and an “overwhelming majority of courts . . . approv[ed] SEC set-
tlements rather routinely,” without thoroughly examining their fac-
tual underpinnings or making substantive changes.5
Some people have suggested, however, that settlements by
public agencies such as the SEC should be scrutinized more closely.
For instance, in a series of recent opinions, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of
the Southern District of New York has “question[ed] the wisdom”
of the SEC’s well-established practice of permitting defendants to
enter into consent judgments while neither admitting nor denying
* Clinical Associate Professor of Law at Fordham Law School where he teaches the Securi-
ties Litigation and Arbitration Clinic.  Prior to joining Fordham’s faculty, Professor Radvany was
a Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York where, among other responsibilities, he oversaw the Securities Fraud Unit.
He would like to thank Sonia Katyal and James P. Jalil for their very helpful comments and also
his research assistants Ryan Gabay and Kevin Kiley for all of their help.
1 Ross MacDonald, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New SEC Enforcement Para-
digm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 421 (2012) (stating that in recent years, the Commission has settled
approximately 98 percent of its cases).
2 Id. at 426–27.
3 Id.
4 SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
5 Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed By History, But Not By Reason”:  Judge Rakoff’s Cri-
tique Of The Securities And Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L.
REV. 51, 69 (2012).
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the allegations.6  This “sparked a new trend of judicial scrutiny for
securities settlements” as other judges have begun to follow Judge
Rakoff’s lead in breaking with the tradition of deferring to the
SEC.7
During the past two years, the SEC has implemented new pol-
icies that have altered its established settlement practices.8  On Jan-
uary 6, 2012, the SEC’s then-Director of Enforcement, Robert
Khuzami, announced that defendants who are found guilty or ad-
mit to wrongdoing in criminal cases may only settle parallel civil
cases with the SEC if they agree to admit to the allegations in the
charge.9  More significantly, on June 18, 2013, SEC Chair Mary Jo
White announced a further alteration to the SEC’s settlement pol-
icy, stating that the SEC will require admissions in particularly se-
vere cases in which a large number of investors had been
defrauded and the fraud was egregious.10
In the aftermath of the policy changes, some felt that requiring
an admission of guilt would lead to fewer settlements.11  Several
commentators predicted that defendants would likely refuse to ad-
mit wrongdoing, instead opting to litigate the dispute because they
would be concerned that an admission would be used against them
in subsequent proceedings.12  In recent months, however, the SEC
has proven that its new settlement policy has “teeth,” extracting
admissions of wrongdoing from large companies such as JPMor-
gan, and individuals such as Philip Falcone.13
This Article will examine the SEC’s revised settlement policy
in the aftermath of Judge Rakoff’s concerns about the SEC’s long-
standing “no admit, no deny” policy.  In order to determine the
import of the SEC’s new settlement policy on the conduct of com-
panies, as well as ongoing investigations and cases, this Article will
also include analysis from lawyers who have advised their clients
on the SEC’s policy change.
6 Id. at 51.
7 Samantha Dreilinger, Is Three a Crowd? The Role of the Courts in SEC Settlements 5–6
(2010), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=samantha_
dreilinger.
8 For an overview of the SEC’s policy changes, see infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
9 See infra notes 169–176 and accompanying text.
10 For a discussion of Chair White’s policy change, see infra Part IV.B.
11 Amanda S. Naoufal, Is Judge Rakoff Asking for Too Much?  The New Standard for Con-
sent Judgment Settlements with the SEC, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 183, 204 (2012).
12 See infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text.
13 For an overview of the JPMorgan and Falcone admissions, see infra Parts IV.C.1–IV.C.2.
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Part II provides an overview of the SEC and its Enforcement
Division, and describes the SEC’s prosecutorial discretion.  Part III
examines Judge Rakoff’s decisions in SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp.14
and SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.15  Part IV analyzes the
policy changes announced by Mr. Khuzami and Chair White, as
well as the recent settlement agreements in which the SEC has re-
quired defendants to admit wrongdoing.  Part V considers the
likely effects that might result from the SEC’s revised approach.
II. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S
ENFORCEMENT POWERS
A. The Establishment of the Securities and
Exchange Commission
The securities markets are essential to the financial and eco-
nomic health of our nation.16  Many people invest in stocks, bonds,
and other securities in order to save money and earn a return on
their investments to help prepare for retirement and meet other
financial objectives.17  Securities are a primary means through
which businesses raise capital and promote economic growth.18
Thus, the securities laws that regulate the capital markets are very
important to the strength of our nation’s economy.
Before the securities market crash of 1929, public support for
the governmental regulation of the United States securities mar-
kets was scarce.19  In 1933, Congress passed our nation’s first fed-
eral securities laws: the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”)
and, during the following year, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the “Exchange Act”). The securities acts were a response to the
growing public perception that stock market activity and the prices
prevailing in the market profoundly affected the welfare of the
country.20
14 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
15 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
16 See James D. Gordon III, Defining A Common Enterprise in Investment Contracts, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 63 (2011).
17 See id. 
18 See id.
19 Uma V. Sridharan et al., The Social Impact of Business Failure: Enron, 17 AM. J. BUS.
(2002) available at http://www.bsu.edu/mcobwin/ajb/?p=199.
20 Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 359, 362.
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Congress established the SEC with the passage of the Ex-
change Act21 to enforce the newly passed securities laws, maintain
the integrity of the securities markets, and, most importantly, pro-
tect investors.22  Today, the SEC’s responsibilities include oversee-
ing the nation’s securities markets and certain primary participants,
such as broker-dealers, investment companies, investment advisers,
clearing agencies, transfer agents, credit rating agencies, and secur-
ities exchanges, as well as organizations such as the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority, Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board, and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.23  Each
year, the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforcement actions against
individuals and companies for violations of securities laws.24
Arguably the Exchange Act’s most important contribution to
the capital markets was the creation of the SEC.25  The act empow-
ered the SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities
industry,26 while seeking to protect the integrity of capital markets
and investors by arming the SEC with its antifraud and anti-manip-
ulation provisions.27
B. Overview of the SEC Enforcement Division
Prior to 1972, the SEC’s enforcement activities were spread
across several operating divisions at the SEC’s headquarters in
Washington, D.C.28  In August 1972, the SEC created the Division
of Enforcement in order to centralize its enforcement activities.29
The Enforcement Division’s stated mission is to “protect investors
and the markets by investigating potential violations of the federal
21 “There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission to be composed of
five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d.
22 Sridharan et al., supra note 19.
23 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:  Fiscal Year 2012 Agency Financial Report 2,
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2012.pdf.
24 Id.
25 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d.
26 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.
gov/about/laws.shtml#secexact1934 (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
27 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (Vicki Been
et al. eds., 7th ed. 2013).
28 Id.
29 About the Division of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2007), http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/about.htm [hereinafter About the Division].
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securities laws and litigating the SEC’s enforcement actions.”30  In
fiscal year 2012,31 the Enforcement Division filed 734 enforcement
actions, which represented the second-largest number of actions
filed by the Division in a fiscal year, one fewer than the previous
year.32  In fiscal year 2013, the Division brought 686 enforcement
actions.33  The decline in enforcement actions may be due to a de-
crease in the number of investigations initiated by the SEC.34  In
2012, the SEC initiated 806 new investigations, a decline of 14 per-
cent from the previous year.35  The SEC may have also brought
fewer enforcement actions because of a “steep falloff in the num-
ber of enforcement actions related to the financial crisis.”36  The
SEC, however, obtained a record $3.4 billion in monetary sanctions
in fiscal year 2013, which represented a ten percent increase from
fiscal year 2012.37
During the 2012 fiscal year, the Enforcement Division filed
150 actions as National Priority Cases, which constitute “the Divi-
sion’s most important and complex matters.”38  National Priority
Cases,39 which the SEC expects will lead to “significant corrective
30 Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement: Enforcement Manual
(2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf; see also About
the Division, supra note 29 (“The Commission’s mandate is to protect investors.”); Matthew P.
Wynne, Rule 10b-5(B) Enforcement Actions in Light of Janus: Making the Case for Agency Def-
erence, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111, 2118 (2013) (stating that the SEC, in making enforcement
decisions, “must balance the multidimensional nature of the SEC’s mission of protecting inves-
tors; maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitating capital formation”).
31 The SEC’s fiscal year ends on September 30.
32 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Fiscal Year 2012 Agency Financial Report 13
(2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2012.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2012 Finan-
cial Report].  The highest number of enforcement actions brought by the Division in a fiscal year
was 735, which occurred in the 2011 fiscal year. Id.




36 Jean Eaglesham, SEC Pads Enforcement Tally With Easy Prey, WALL ST. J., available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141863675545256 (last up-
dated Oct. 17, 2013).
37 SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2013, (Dec. 17, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540503617#.UrNsW0KhDzI.
38 SEC 2012 Financial Report, supra note 32.
39 The determination of whether a case is a National Priority Case is a discretionary matter
left to the Director of the Division of Enforcement. See Securities and Exchange Commission
Division of Enforcement: Enforcement Manual 4 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/divi-
sions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.  The Director may consider several factors, including: (1)
whether the matter presents an opportunity to send a strong message of deterrence; (2) whether
the matter involves particularly egregious conduct; (3) whether the matter involves widespread
harm to investors; (4) whether the matter involves misconduct by fiduciaries or other persons
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industry reaction,”40 have grown in importance at the SEC and re-
present 20 percent of enforcement actions filed by the SEC in fiscal
year 2012.41
Most cases brought by the SEC do not proceed to trial as an
overwhelming majority of SEC cases that end with sanctions are
settled.42  The SEC settles approximately 98 percent of its cases,
totaling between 650 and 700 settlements each year.43  In the rare
instances that SEC cases reach trial, the SEC has had an impressive
success rate: in fiscal year 2012, the Enforcement Division pre-
vailed at trial against 95 percent of defendants, losing only one case
while winning twenty-one.44
The Division of Enforcement has the investigative authority to
“administer oaths and affirmations, subpena [sic] witnesses, compel
their attendance, take evidence, and require the production of any
books, papers, correspondence, memoranda, or other records
which the Commission deems relevant or material to the in-
quiry.”45  Following an investigation, SEC staff members must re-
ceive authorization from the Commission to bring an enforcement
action.46  In order to receive authorization, a trial attorney is re-
quired to submit an action memorandum to the SEC containing
the Division’s recommendation and “a comprehensive explanation
of the recommendation’s factual and legal foundation.”47  Prior to
submitting the action memorandum, the trial attorney must obtain
with substantial ability to affect the market; (5) whether the matter pertains to a large number of
potential victims; and (6) whether the matter affects products, transactions, or practices that the
Division has targeted as priority areas. Id.
40 David F. Marcus & Sara E. Gilley, The Future of SEC Enforcement Actions, LAW 360
(2013), available at http://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/f2d41ac5-e8d7vvvvvv-45e6-a011-
7266794fcd27/The-Future-Of-SEC-Enforcement-Actions.aspx.
41 Id.  The Division saw a 30 percent increase in the number of National Priority Cases filed
in comparison to 2011. See SEC 2012 Financial Report, supra note 32.
42 David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1849 (2012).
43 MacDonald, supra note 1, at 421; see also Elaine Buckberg et al., NERA Econ. Consult-
ing, SEC Settlement Trends: 2H11 Update 5 (2012), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/
PUB_SEC_Trends_2H11_0612.pdf.  In 2011, the SEC settled 682 cases. Id.
44 SEC’s Enforcement Program Continues to Show Strong Results in Safeguarding Investors
and Markets (Nov. 14, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRe-
lease/1365171485830#.UkXQ30KhDzI.
45 Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission:  A Critical Review of the His-
tory and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 371
(2008).
46 Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement: Enforcement Manual, Of-
fice of Chief Counsel § 2.5.1 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/en-
forcementmanual.pdf.
47 Id.
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the approval of the Director or a Deputy Director of the Divi-
sion.48  Once the Commission has received the recommendation, it
votes on whether to approve the recommendation.49  In order to
consider the recommendation, a quorum of three Commissioners is
needed.50  If a majority of the Commissioners votes in favor of the
recommendation, it is approved.51  The Commission will usually
adopt the course of action recommended by the Division.52
If the Enforcement Division receives authorization from the
Commission, it may then utilize its significant enforcement pow-
ers.53  If the Division determines that a federal securities law has
been violated, it may bring a civil action in federal district court
seeking a permanent or temporary injunction against any potential
violators.54  Moreover, the SEC can refer the case to the United
States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) if it believes that criminal
prosecution may be warranted.55  In civil suits, the SEC may also
seek to impose civil monetary sanctions56 by disgorging illegal prof-
its or by obtaining an order from the court requiring defendants to
pay a civil fine.57  The purpose of disgorgement orders is to strip
violators of their unjust enrichment, while civil fines aim to punish
or deter violators from committing future acts of misconduct.58  In
addition, the Enforcement Division may request that a court pro-
hibit individuals from serving as officers or directors of registered
companies.59  The SEC itself also possesses the authority to order
defendants to pay a fine60 and may request equitable relief, such as
48 Id.
49 Id. at § 2.5.2.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 George E. Greer, SEC Investigations and Enforcement Actions 16–17, ORRICK (2001),
available at http://www.orrick.com/Events-and-Publications/Documents/4085.pdf.
53 Brad Begin, A Proposed Blueprint for Achieving Cooperation in Policing Transborder Se-
curities Fraud, 27 VA. J. INT’L L. 65, 75 (1986) (noting that the Division is “charged with far-
reaching enforcement responsibilities”).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1); About the Division, supra note 29 (“The Commission’s enforce-
ment staff conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws, and pros-
ecutes the Commission’s civil suits in the federal courts . . . .”).
55 Wynne, supra note 30, at 2119.
56 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3).
57 Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 690 (2012).
58 Id.
59 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2); see also About the Division, supra note 29.
60 About the Division, supra note 29.
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a requirement that the defendants reform their compliance
procedures.61
The Enforcement Division also possesses the exclusive power
to suspend or bar broker-dealers or individuals from the industry.62
The Exchange Act permits the SEC to suspend the registration of a
broker-dealer for no more than twelve months, or bar the broker-
dealer or firm from the industry.63  Expelling a broker-dealer from
the industry represents “the harshest penalty available to the Com-
mission.”64  The formal authority to expel registered broker-deal-
ers rests entirely with the SEC; a district court, therefore, cannot
issue an order banning or suspending a broker-dealer from the in-
dustry itself.65  Nor can the broker-dealer appeal such a ban to the
district court.66  In practice, though, the SEC will often impose a
ban only after it has procured an injunction from the district court,
because an injunction permits the SEC to initiate administrative
proceedings to determine whether a ban will be in the public
interest.67
The Enforcement Division can bring several different types of
administrative proceedings against alleged violators of the SEC’s
rules and regulations.68  The SEC can issue cease and desist orders
in administrative proceedings directing defendants to refrain from
misconduct.69  These orders are “largely a public reprimand of the
defendant’s conduct.”70  Administrative proceedings may result in
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), but, in
practice, these disputes are usually settled with the SEC prior to a
61 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5); see also Gadinis, supra note 57, at 690.
62 Gadinis, supra note 57, at 690.  For the most part, the SEC has delegated this power to the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
63 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
64 Gadinis, supra note 57, at 690–91 (stating that expulsion from the industry forces defend-
ants to cease their current business activities and enter a new profession, which will often be
“substantially less lucrative”).
65 Id.
66 See Altman v. United States SEC, 768 F. Supp. 2d 554, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that
under § 25 of the Exchange Act, an aggrieved party may challenge a sanction only in the Court
of Appeals).
67 Gadinis, supra note 57, at 690–91
68 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2.
69 Id. at § 78u-3; Becker, supra note 42, at 1852; Andrew M. Smith, SEC Cease-And-Desist
Orders, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1999) (noting that cease-and-desist orders “have become
one of the SEC’s most used remedies”).
70 Gadinis, supra note 57, at 690.
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hearing.71  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act now provides that the SEC also has the power to
impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings.72  Defendants
often prefer administrative proceedings to actions in district courts
because the public’s access to information about the defendant’s
alleged misconduct is limited in administrative proceedings.73  In
administrative proceedings, the SEC can “avoid juries, most dis-
covery, delays, and strict application of the rules of evidence.”74
The SEC benefits from initiating an administrative proceeding be-
cause it can settle the matter quickly “without the need to obtain
an ALJ’s approval,” while the SEC must receive a judge’s approval
to settle a civil action brought in federal court.75
There are several advantages for the SEC when it settles cases
rather than trying them.  By settling with defendants, the SEC is
able to conserve its limited resources instead of expending large
amounts of time and resources on litigation.76  It also benefits from
settling cases because it avoids the risk of taking a case to trial and
losing.77  If the SEC loses a case it could have otherwise settled, it
could lead to public embarrassment and lower recovery for
victims.78
Defendants also benefit from settling cases.  Settlement limits
litigation risks for defendants as well, allowing them to avoid the
potential of being responsible for even larger penalties at trial.79
By settling, defendants also avoid the time and expense associated
with going to trial.80  In addition, settling permits companies to
71 Id. at 688; see also Morell E. Mullins, Manual For Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES i, 35 (2004) (stating that a case may settle at a variety of different
times, including “as soon as [it is] assigned to an ALJ”); Susan P. Shapiro, The Road Not Taken:
The Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for White-Collar Offenders, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179,
187 (1985) (stating that administrative proceedings “occasionally involve hearings,” but that
charges are usually settled).
72 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P (2010).
73 Gadinis, supra note 57, at 688.
74 Victor L. Hayslip & Kip A. Nesmith, Recent Cases and Decisions in Securities Law, 2011
WL 1574311, at *7 (Apr. 2011).
75 William O. Reckler and Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the SEC’s
“Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlement Policy, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR (Mar. 2012)
(“While the SEC can settle administrative actions brought internally without review by an ad-
ministrative law judge, it must obtain a federal judge’s approval to settle an action brought in
district court.”).
76 MacDonald, supra note 1, at 428.
77 Id. at 429.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 432.
80 Id.
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“avoid potentially devastating negative publicity,” which is impor-
tant in maintaining credibility with investors.81  Consent judgments
are usually announced on the same day that the complaint is filed,
which may allow defendants to lessen any negative publicity.82
C. The SEC’s Prosecutorial Discretion
The SEC’s public reputation is derived largely from its respon-
sibilities as a “prosecutorial agency—the policeman of Wall
Street.”83  The SEC has a “vast and varied arsenal of prosecutorial
weapons” at its disposal.84  As mentioned above, among other
powers, it can issue cease-and-desist orders,85 stop order registra-
tion statements,86 revoke or suspend the registration of broker-
dealers,87 and issue fines.88
Since the SEC often works in tandem with the DOJ to fight
financial crime, parallel proceedings often occur.  Parallel proceed-
ings involve multiple investigations or actions arising out of the
same or substantially the same set of facts, “proceed[ing] simulta-
neously or successively against the same or related parties.”89  The
SEC possesses the authority to conduct both civil and criminal in-
vestigations of violations of the federal securities laws, but it lacks
independent prosecutorial power.90  The DOJ has exclusive juris-
diction over criminal proceedings.91
In 2006, the SEC issued its Statement Concerning Financial
Penalties to clarify the Commission’s official policy regarding the
extent to which it should impose civil penalties against corpora-
81 Id. at 433 & n.100.
82 See Roger Parloff, The Judge Who Slapped Citi, CNNMONEY (Nov. 30, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/30/judge-jed-rakoff-citigroup-sec/.
83 Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The Lawyer
As Prosecutor, 61 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (1998).
84 Id.
85 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1, 77(h)(d)(3) (2006).
86 Id. at § 77(h)(d)(3).
87 Id. at § 78l(k).
88 Id. at § 78u-2.
89 Jody M. Arogeti, How Much Cooperation Between Government Agencies Is Too Much?:
Reconciling United States v. Scrushy, The Corporate Fraud Task Force, And The Nature Of
Parallel Proceedings, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
90 Id. at 428–29.
91 Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ Parallel Proceedings: Contemplating the Propriety of Recent
Judicial Trends, 68 MO. L. REV. 149, 160 (2003).
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tions.92  Noting that recent cases have not presented a “clear public
view of when and how the Commission will use corporate penal-
ties,” the SEC stated that “[w]here shareholders have been victim-
ized by the violative conduct, or by the resulting negative effect on
the entity following its discovery, the Commission is expected to
seek penalties from culpable individual offenders acting for the
corporation.”93  In determining the appropriateness of seeking
penalties against a corporation, the SEC further explained that it
would consider whether the corporation received a direct benefit
as a result of the violation and the extent to which the penalty will
benefit or further harm the victims of the misconduct.94  By seeking
such penalties, the Commission aims to increase its ability to
“achieve an appropriate level of deterrence.”95
In determining whether to refer a case to the DOJ for criminal
prosecution, the SEC typically focuses on violations involving cor-
ruption of SEC staff or other government officials, as well as viola-
tions committed by a repeat violator or posing a substantial threat
to investors.96  In 2013, the SEC released further guidelines regard-
ing referrals for criminal prosecution, stating that SEC staff mem-
bers may consider “the egregiousness of the conduct, whether
recidivism is a factor, and whether the involvement of criminal au-
thorities will provide additional meaningful protection to inves-
tors.”97  Local United States Attorneys have the discretion to
accept or reject cases referred by the SEC.98  If they choose to ac-
cept a case, they retain “full responsibility for the [cases’] conduct
and outcome.”99  Between 1992 and 2001, the SEC referred 609
cases to the DOJ and the DOJ acted on 525 of these cases.100
92 Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties, U.S.




96 Hunter, supra note 91; Steven Amchem et al., Securities Fraud, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1037, 1093 (2002).
97 Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement: Enforcement Manual, Of-
fice of Chief Counsel § 5.6.1 (Oct. 9, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/
enforcementmanual.pdf.
98 Susan P. Shapiro, The Road Not Taken:  The Elusive Path to Criminal Prosecution for
White-Collar Offenders, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179, 187 (1985).
99 Id.
100 Clifton Leaf et al., White-Collar Criminals:  Enough is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002,
at 60.
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III. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF THE SEC’S SETTLEMENT PRACTICES
A. Judge Rakoff’s Critique of the SEC’s Settlement Practices
In SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Judge Jed Rakoff, United
States District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York,
initially rejected a proposed consent judgment between the SEC
and Bank of America Corp. (“Bank of America”).101  Prior to this
case, the SEC “was not used to close scrutiny of its settlements.”102
This appears to be the first time that a district court judge had scru-
tinized a settlement between the SEC and a defendant so
closely.103
1. SEC v. Bank of America Corp.
In 2009, Judge Rakoff rejected a proposed settlement in a case
brought by the SEC.  In SEC v. Bank of America Corp.,104 the SEC
alleged that the defendant, Bank of America, materially misled its
shareholders in connection with a proxy statement soliciting share-
holder approval for a $50 billion acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co
(“Merrill Lynch”).105  According to the SEC, the proxy statement
informed shareholders that Merrill Lynch had agreed to refrain
from paying discretionary incentive compensation to executives
prior to the merger without the consent of Bank of America.106  In
fact, Bank of America had already agreed to permit Merrill Lynch
to pay large discretionary bonuses to executives before the closing
of the merger.107  Prior to trial, Bank of America, without admit-
ting or denying the allegations set forth in the complaint, entered
into a consent judgment with the SEC.108
While acknowledging that “considerable deference” should be
shown to the parties’ agreement, Judge Rakoff, the District Court
Judge presiding over the case, refused to approve the proposed
101 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
102 Peter J. Henning, Can the S.E.C. Avoid Scrutiny of Its Settlements?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2010), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/08/17/can-the-s-e-c-avoid-scrutiny-of-its-set-
tlements/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
103 See Macchiarola, supra note 5, at 53.
104 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
105 Id. at 508.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.  Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Bank of America was enjoined from
making future misstatements in its proxy solicitations and agreed to pay a fine of $33 million to
the SEC. Id.
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consent judgment, concluding that it was “neither fair, nor reasona-
ble, nor adequate.”109  Noting that the agreement did “not comport
with the most elementary notions of justice and morality,” Judge
Rakoff stated that the consent judgment was unfair because it
would force innocent shareholders, who were victims of Bank of
America’s alleged wrongdoing, to pay a fine for the misconduct.110
Left with the impression that the agreement proposed by the par-
ties “was a contrivance designed to provide the S.E.C. with the
facade of enforcement and the management of the Bank with a
quick resolution of an embarrassing inquiry—all at the expense of
the sole alleged victims, the shareholders,” Judge Rakoff deter-
mined that the parties’ proposal “cannot remotely be called
fair.”111
Judge Rakoff also concluded that the proposed consent judg-
ment was unreasonable, stating that approval of the agreement
would effectively end the case without an adequate explanation
from the SEC regarding why, in violation of its own policy,112 it
failed to pursue charges against those who were truly responsible
for the misconduct—the Bank of America’s executives and lawyers
who allegedly made the false and misleading statements.113
In addition, Judge Rakoff felt that the proposed consent judg-
ment was unreasonable because it was imprecise in providing for
injunctive relief.114  Although the proposed injunction sought to
prohibit the bank from issuing any false or misleading statements
in the future, Judge Rakoff decided that it was “too nebulous” be-
cause Bank of America refused to acknowledge that it made any
false or misleading statements in the past or in connection with the
case.115  Because the bank did not admit to making any materially
misleading statements, the court questioned how it could impose
injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) in the
absence of a sufficiently detailed description of the acts to be
restrained.116
109 Id. at 508–9.
110 Id. at 509.
111 Id. at 510.
112 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
113 Bank of Amer., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 510–11.
114 Id. at 511.
115 Id.
116 Id.  Rule 65(d) states that when a court enters an order granting an injunction, the order
must “state the reasons why it issued, . . . its terms specifically, and describe in reasonable de-
tail—and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or
required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
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The judge determined that the injunctive relief served no pur-
pose and that the $33 million fine was “a trivial penalty” to pay for
a false statement that materially affected such a large-scale
merger.117  He explained that the proposed agreement “suggest[ed]
a rather cynical relationship between the parties,” in which the
SEC could expose Bank of America’s misconduct in a high-profile
merger, while the bank’s management would be able to assert that
they were pressured into accepting a burdensome settlement by
overzealous regulators.118  Judge Rakoff concluded by noting that
he believed that the parties had entered into the proposed agree-
ment “at the expense . . . of the truth.”119
Following Judge Rakoff’s decision, the parties renegotiated,
and the SEC filed a motion on February 4, 2010 seeking approval
of a revised proposed consent judgment.120  The new proposed set-
tlement consisted of a package of prophylactic measures that
aimed to prevent future nondisclosures121 and a penalty provision
that was meant to partially compensate the victims.122  Judge
Rakoff noted that the measures were an improvement that might
help foster an environment in which public disclosure is more
likely, because the measures might help eliminate Bank of
America’s piecemeal approach to providing disclosure to the
public.123
However, the court had “great[ ] difficulty” approving the
penalty provision because the provision effectively provided for a
$150 million fine to be collected from all shareholders and distrib-
uted to current shareholders who were victims of the miscon-
duct.124  Although Judge Rakoff determined that the fine was very
small in comparison to the size of the controversy125 and that the
117 Id. at 512.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
121 The package of prophylactic measures consisted of Bank of America:  (1) engaging an
independent auditor to assess the adequacy of the Bank’s accounting controls and disclosure
policy; (2) hiring independent disclosure counsel to assess the adequacy of the Bank’s public
disclosures; (3) engaging an outside compensation consultant to advise an independent compen-
sation committee regarding executive compensation; and (4) agreeing to submit executive com-
pensation proposals to shareholders for approval. Id. at *3.
122 Id. at *3.
123 Id. at *4.
124 Id. at *4–5.  The SEC estimated that the group of current shareholders who were harmed
by the nondisclosures comprises approximately 50 percent of all current shareholders. Id. at *5.
125 Id. at *4.
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proposed settlement was “far from ideal,”126 he “reluctantly”
granted the SEC’s motion seeking approval of the consent
judgment.127
2. SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
On November 28, 2011, almost two years after his decision in
SEC v. Bank of America Corp., Judge Rakoff again rejected a pro-
posed settlement in an enforcement action involving the SEC.128
In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., the SEC had charged
Citigroup with securities fraud stemming from Citigroup’s creation
of a billion-dollar fund that permitted it to “dump some dubious
assets on misinformed investors.”129  Citigroup allegedly perpe-
trated the fraud by misrepresenting to investors that the assets in
the fund were attractive assets, even though Citigroup in fact had
chosen to include a large percentage of negatively projected assets
in the portfolio.130
In addition to filing the complaint, the SEC simultaneously
presented a proposed consent judgment to the court.131  The con-
sent judgment required Citigroup to pay the $160 million profit it
made from the alleged scheme to the SEC, plus $30 million in in-
terest and $95 million as a civil penalty.132
The court stated that it “regretfully” could not approve the
consent judgment, concluding that the proposed settlement was
“neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public inter-
est.”133  Judge Rakoff explained that the court could not approve
the settlement without knowledge of the underlying facts because,
otherwise, “the court becomes a mere handmaiden” to a settle-
ment negotiated based on unknown facts, while the public is una-
ble to learn the truth about the matter.134  In effect, the SEC’s
policy of entering into consent judgments while allowing defend-
ants to “neither admit nor deny” the allegations did not allow the
126 Id. at *6.
127 Id. at *1.
128 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
129 Id. at 329.
130 Id.  By structuring the fund in this manner, Citigroup allegedly gained profits of approxi-
mately $160 million, while investors lost in excess of $700 million. Id.
131 Id. at 330.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 330, 332.
134 Id. at 332.
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court to have any confidence that the injunctive relief sought by
the SEC had any factual support.135
Judge Rakoff further noted that the proposed consent judg-
ment, while serving to provide the SEC with a “quick headline,”
did not commit the SEC to returning any of the recovered money
to investors who were hoping to recoup a portion of their losses.136
He also noted that the $95 million civil penalty was “pocket
change” for a company as large as Citigroup.137  The court con-
cluded by rejecting the proposed settlement and directing the par-
ties to be ready for trial.138
The SEC and Citibank appealed Judge Rakoff’s denial of the
proposed consent judgment to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.139  The Second Circuit granted the parties’
motion to stay the proceedings in the district court pending ap-
peal,140 stating that the parties demonstrated a “strong likelihood
of success” on the merits in their attempt to reverse the lower
court’s decision.141
In granting the parties’ motion to stay proceedings in the dis-
trict court, the Second Circuit stated that the district court did “not
appear to have given deference to the S.E.C.’s judgment on wholly
discretionary matters of policy.”142  Noting that federal judges must
respect the legitimate policy choices of agencies, the Second Circuit
explained that “[i]t is not . . . the proper function of federal courts
to dictate policy to executive administrative agencies.”143  The Sec-
ond Circuit has yet to render a decision regarding whether Judge
Rakoff properly rejected the proposed consent judgment, so it is
unclear whether the decision will stand.
3. The Aftermath of Judge Rakoff’s Decisions
In response to the Citigroup decision, the SEC Director of En-
forcement, Robert Khuzami, argued that Judge Rakoff’s ruling
“disregards the fact that obtaining disgorgement, monetary penal-
ties, and mandatory business reforms may significantly outweigh
the absence of an admission when that relief is obtained without
135 Id.
136 Id. at 333–34.
137 Id. at 334.
138 Id. at 335.
139 SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 160 (2d Cir. 2012).
140 Id. at 161.
141 Id. at 166.
142 Id. at 163.
143 Id.
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the risks, delay, and resources required at trial.”144  Mr. Khuzami
also noted that “[r]efusing an otherwise advantageous settlement
solely because of the absence of an admission also would divert
resources away from the investigation of other frauds and the re-
covery of losses suffered by other investors not before the
court.”145
Mr. Khuzami explained that if companies are required to
make admissions in order to settle cases with the SEC, they might
also face more suits from private litigants, thus prompting compa-
nies to settle fewer cases.146  A drop-off in settlements may not
necessarily lead to more just resolutions of disputes.147  Although
settlements may not be perfect resolutions in many cases, “it is not
at all clear that litigating or forcing defendants to ‘admit’ the SEC’s
charges would in any fashion provide a better, much less a more
just, outcome,” because it is possible that the SEC could reach a
similar outcome without the time and expense associated with go-
ing to trial.148
Judge Rakoff’s decisions may also have an impact on the pub-
lic’s perception that the public interest is being adequately pro-
tected.149  In Citigroup, the SEC asserted that “the detailed
allegations of the Complaint, the substantial payment by Citigroup,
the company’s lack of a denial of the allegations, and Citigroup’s
public statement regarding the matter have put the public on no-
144 Robert Khuzami, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Recent Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm.
145 Id.
146 See Robert Khuzami, Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America’s Financial
Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch
120111rk.htm (stating that companies might avoid settlements if forced to make admissions to
the SEC “because that might expose them to additional lawsuits by litigants seeking damages”);
see also Marc Fagel, The SEC’s Troubling New Policy Requiring Admissions 2, BLOOMBERG
BNA:  SECURITIES REG. & LAW REP. (2013) (“Admitting liability would subject the defendant
to tremendous exposure in private litigation.”); McLucas, et al., Public Interests And ‘Neither
Admit Nor Deny’ Settlements (2012), LAW 360, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/
321782/public-interests-and-neither-admit-nor-deny-settlements (discussing that requiring a de-
fendant to admit to misconduct may increase the risks of liability for defendants, “likely forcing
many to meaningfully consider choosing a path of litigation rather than resolution”).
147 McLucas, et al., supra note 146.
148 See id.
149 While the exact effect of Judge Rakoff’s rulings on the public’s perception remains to be
seen, it has been suggested that Judge Rakoff’s Bank of America opinion “[g]ave voice to the
anger and frustration of many ordinary Americans.” Zachery Kouwe, Judge Rejects Settlement
Over Merrill Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, at B15.
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tice as to Citigroup’s conduct.”150  While contending that the pro-
posed consent judgment was in the public interest, the SEC
maintained that the public interest was “not part of [the] applicable
standard of judicial review” and that a consent judgment should be
approved if it is fair, reasonable and adequate.151  The SEC further
asserted that “[t]he initial determination whether a consent decree
is in the public interest is best left to the SEC.”152  Thus, the SEC
argued that if it initially determines that a consent judgment is in
the public interest, the court should defer to this decision.153
Judge Rakoff’s scrutiny of SEC settlement practices may have
also led other federal court judges to “employ similarly-cautious
reviews” of proposed consent judgments that lack party admis-
sions.154  For example, on December 20, 2012, Judge Leon of the
District of Columbia District Court ordered IBM and the SEC to
produce more data in support of their settlement, stating that
“[t]his is not a rubber stamp court.”155  Judge Leon further stated,
“I’m not interested in summary conclusive statements by lawyers,
I’m interested in data.”156  He declared that he is “part of a grow-
ing number of District Court judges in the country who have grown
150 SEC Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding Pro-
posed Settlement, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 07387 (JSR), 2011 WL
5307417, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011).
151 Id. at *4 n.1.
152 Id. at *9 (quoting SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1984).
153 Id.
154 Sarah L. Cave, Developments in 2011 Reflect Uncertainty and Change in Securities Litiga-
tion and Regulatory Enforcement Proceedings, 2012 WL 1197183, at *14; see also Another Judge
Questions SEC Settlement Practices, SEC ENFORCEMENT QUARTERLY 6, available at http://www.
sidley.com/files/News/5892a2c3-d558-4104-a54a-faff23f26fb8/Presentation/NewsAttachment/cd
78beeb-5a42-41b8-bf13-772647e047e6/SEC%20Enforcement%20Quarterly%20-%201st%20
Quarter%202013.pdf (stating that Judge Rakoff “may have started a trend of federal judges
scrutinizing SEC settlements”); Macchiarola, supra note 5, at 89 (2012) (“Other judges have
shown various degrees of support for [Judge Rakoff’s] line of thought, as the Commission is
being asked to satisfy specific court-directed inquiries like no time in recent memory.”); Naoufal,
supra note 11, at 206 (stating that other district courts are already citing to Judge Rakoff’s opin-
ion); Eric Rieder et al., Shifting Tides for SEC Settlements:  A Sea Change in the Making?, BUS.
L. TODAY 1 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
blt/2012/03/shifting-tides-sec-201203.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that at least two federal judges
have “echoed Judge Rakoff’s concerns regarding no-admit/deny settlements between the SEC
and private parties”).
155 Another Judge Questions SEC Settlement Practices, supra note 154.
156 Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts IBM, SEC Bribery Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
20, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578192040
347143214.
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increasingly concerned about . . . just simply signing off on consent
decrees.”157
In addition, Judge Rudolph T. Randa of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin expressed simi-
lar concerns in determining whether to approve a settlement be-
tween the SEC, Koss Corp., and its CEO, Michael Koss.158  On
December 20, 2011, Judge Randa initially refused to approve the
settlement, requiring the SEC to submit a “written factual predi-
cate for why it believes the Court should find that the proposed
final judgments are fair, reasonable, and in the public interest.”159
Judge Randa stated that the court was unable to assess the “fair-
ness and the extent to which [the proposed settlement] serve[s] the
purpose of disgorgement” in the absence of further information
from the parties.160  Ultimately, Judge Randa approved the settle-
ment between the parties on the condition that the SEC agreed to
submit a revised proposed consent judgment providing greater
specificity.161
If courts begin to require the SEC to obtain an admission from
defendants in order to impose penalties or enjoin defendants in
federal court, then the SEC might “enter into settlements outside
of the judiciary’s purview,” thereby avoiding the need for judicial
approval of the settlements.162  While the SEC can settle only ac-
tions brought in federal district court if it receives judicial approval,
the SEC can settle a dispute without approval from a judge in cer-
tain proceedings outside of the court system, such as administrative
proceedings.163  The SEC, however, may be reluctant to bring more
cases before an ALJ because the SEC employs the judges that pre-
side over the administrative proceedings, thus causing some to
question whether the proceedings “suffer from potential bias.”164
157 Another Judge Questions SEC Settlement Practices, supra note 154.
158 Rieder et al., supra note 154.
159 Id.
160 Evan Weinberger, Judge in Koss Suit the Latest to Challenge SEC Deals, LAW 360 (Dec.
22, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/295866/judge-in-koss-suit-the-latest-to-challenge-sec-
deals.
161 Rieder et al., supra note 154.
162 See Bradley Bondi & Douglas Fischer, Citigroup Ruling Has Serious Implications for SEC
Settlements, JURIST-SIDEBAR (Jan. 16, 2012), http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/bondifischer-sec-ci-
tigroup.php.
163 See supra notes 68–75.
164 See Gretchen Morgenson, At the SEC, a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2013, at BU1; see also Jason D. Vendel, General Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There
a Remedy for Social Security Disability Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770 (2005) (stating
that “few will deny that bias inevitably seeps into [the] decisionmaking process[es] of [ALJs]”).
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Thus, in certain cases, if the SEC brings an action in federal district
court, its remaining options may be to either “obtain admissions of
wrongdoing from defendants or . . . prove its allegations at trial.”165
Although perhaps one cannot read too much into the Second
Circuit’s language in staying Judge Rakoff’s decision in Citigroup,
the appellate court did give some indication that it would overturn
the decision.  The court stated that the district court did not appear
to give the proper amount of deference to the SEC’s judgment.166
Moreover, attorneys have advised their clients that “parties should
take comfort in the fact” that the decision by the Second Circuit to
stay proceedings in the district court pending appeal strongly sug-
gests that district court judges should defer to the SEC when ana-
lyzing SEC settlement decisions.167  If the Second Circuit overturns
the decision,168 then district court judges will be required, to defer
to the SEC’s judgment and not question the SEC’s decisions.
IV. THE RECENT CHANGES IN COMMISSION POLICY
A. The SEC’s First Step in Seeking More Admissions
On January 6, 2012, the SEC Director of Enforcement, Robert
Khuzami, announced that a defendant who has been found guilty
of or who has admitted to misconduct in a criminal case may not
settle a parallel civil case without admitting the allegations set forth
in the SEC’s charge.169  Previously, the SEC had permitted defend-
ants to enter into settlement agreements in such cases with defend-
ants without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.170  The
165 See Bondi & Fischer, supra note 162.
166 See SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2012).
167 See Douglas J. Davison et al., The SEC’s Longstanding “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settle-
ment Policy is Supported by Second Circuit Decision Granting Stay (2012), available at http://
www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=92292.
168 At the time this piece was written, the Second Circuit had not yet issued an opinion.
169 Macchiarola, supra note 5, at 93–94; Public Statement by SEC Staff:  Recent Policy
Change, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/
Detail/PublicStmt/1365171489600#.UrjmY0KhDzI.
170 SEC Changes Policy On Settlement Language; “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Approach Nar-
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Commission has “expressly denied” any connection between Judge
Rakoff’s decisions and the policy change.171
The new policy dictates that if a defendant admits or acknowl-
edges criminal conduct in a parallel criminal conviction, non-prose-
cution agreement (“NPA”), or deferred prosecution agreement
(“DPA”), the defendant will be prohibited from settling parallel
SEC charges using the “neither admit nor deny language.”172  In
place of this language, SEC settlement documents will include the
nature of the criminal conviction and relevant facts that the defen-
dant admitted during a plea allocution or in the NPA or DPA.173
This new policy, however, will apply to only a handful of SEC
proceedings.174  Unless the defendant is a party to parallel criminal
proceedings and the defendant has “admitted or acknowledged
criminal conduct,” the new policy will not apply to the enforcement
proceedings.175  The policy will also not apply to pending matters in
which settlement discussions had already begun prior to the an-
nouncement of the policy change.176  Thus, the policy change has
no effect for “the vast majority of settling parties.”177  As a result of
the policy change, many lawyers advised their clients that, until
more courts become critical of settlements that lack admissions,
the SEC can be expected to continue its practice of entering into
settlements that include the “neither admit nor deny” language in
cases that do not involve admissions in parallel criminal
proceedings.178
171 Macchiarola, supra note 5, at 94.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Rieder et al., supra note 154.
175 Id.
176 Harry S. David et al., SEC Update:  Enforcement Program Taking Shape Under New




177 Macchiarola, supra note 5, at 94.
178 William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Client Alert:  Understanding Recent Changes to
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B. Chair White’s Policy Change: Seeking Admissions in
Egregious Cases
On June 18, 2013, Chair White announced a larger shift in the
SEC’s settlement policy.179  She explained that the SEC planned to
require admissions in certain cases and would base its decision on
the egregiousness of the fraud and the amount of harm done to
investors.180  Thus, for the first time in the Enforcement Division’s
history, it planned to require admissions in particularly egregious
cases.181
During the same week, SEC co-directors of enforcement, An-
drew J. Ceresney and George S. Canellos, sent an internal memo-
randum to the SEC’s enforcement team that provided details
regarding the types of conduct that would lead the SEC to seek an
admission: “misconduct that harmed large numbers of investors or
placed investors or the market at risk of potentially serious harm;
where admissions might safeguard against risks posed by the defen-
dant to the investing public . . . or when the defendant engaged in
unlawful obstruction of the Commission’s investigative
processes.”182  The memo further noted that “no-admit-no-deny
settlements will continue to serve an important role in our mission
and most cases will continue to be resolved on that basis.”183
Andrew Ceresney explained that the SEC planned to settle a
case “only when in our informed judgment the settlement is within
a range that we could reasonably expect if we litigate through
trial.”184  He also confirmed  that it still would be important for the
SEC to continue to have the ability to enter into “neither admit
nor deny” settlements because these settlements achieve the SEC’s
goals of providing quick relief to investors, conserving SEC re-
sources, and limiting litigation risks.185  Lastly, Mr. Ceresney de-
clared that “neither admit nor deny” settlements remain important
179 Dave Michaels, SEC Says It Will Seek Admissions of Wrongdoing More Often, BLOOM-




182 Kara Scannell, SEC Considers Policy Shift on Admissions of Wrongdoing, June 19, 2013,
FINANCIAL TIMES, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a93d5dc-d882-11e2-b4a4-00144feab7de.html#
axzz2oPnQOZkB.
183 Michaels, supra note 179.
184 SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit Nor Deny Settlements, CORP. CRIME REP.
(June 6, 2013), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/secceresneyneitheradmitnor
deny06062013/.
185 Id.
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because “[t]he facts are aired in detail in our orders.  The defen-
dant doesn’t have any ability to deny those facts.  We have ac-
countability.  We have deterrence.”186
In a speech on September 26, 2013, SEC Chair Mary Jo White
clarified that the SEC will likely seek admissions in cases where:
(1) harm to a large number investors or particularly egregious con-
duct has occurred; (2) there is conduct that poses a significant risk
to the market or investors; (3) admissions would help investors de-
termine whether to deal with the party again in the future; and (4)
an admission would send a crucial message to the market about the
case.187
Recently, Chair White indicated that the SEC plans to seek
more admissions of guilt in 2014 following its policy changes.188
She stated that “[t]he coming year promises to be an incredibly
active year in enforcement, as we continue to vigorously pursue
wrongdoers and bring enforcement actions across the entire indus-
try spectrum.”189
According to Chair White, her review of the SEC’s “no admit,
no deny” settlement practices began after she had observed the
policy as a federal prosecutor prior to joining the SEC.190  In the
1990s, she served as United States Attorney in Manhattan, “pio-
neer[ing] the use of corporate probation” in white collar crime.191
Chair White explained that the decision to make the policy change
stemmed from her experience as United States Attorney, in which
“defendants in criminal cases are almost always required either to
enter a guilty plea or go to trial.”192  Chair White noted that al-
though Judge Rakoff and other federal judges put the issue of the
186 Id.
187 Mary Jo White, Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202#.Ukd93kKh
DzI.




190 Michaels, supra note 179.
191 Id.
192 James B. Stewart, The SEC Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Department of Justice,
“except in the most unusual circumstances,” does not permit defendants to enter pleas of nolo
contendere, in which defendants plead guilty to criminal charges while neither admitting nor
denying the factual allegations. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Manual § 9-16.010 (2008)
(“United States Attorneys may not consent to a plea of nolo contendere except in the most
unusual circumstances and only after a recommendation for doing so has been approved by the
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SEC’s “no admit, no deny” settlement practices “more in the pub-
lic eye, . . . it wasn’t his comments that precipitated the change.”193
She had “lived with this issue for a very long time” and was there-
fore prompted to review the SEC’s settlement practices in order to
strengthen the agency’s enforcement program.194
Immediately following the policy change, some felt that de-
fendants might be reluctant to make admissions due to the fear
that plaintiffs in class actions or other private actions would use the
admissions against them.195  Defendants may face large costs due
to subsequent litigation, which may influence them to choose to
take the case to trial rather than settle.196  Although an admission
in an SEC consent judgment may ultimately be inadmissible in a
subsequent civil trial, as Professor Coffee of Columbia Law School
noted, the admission may still have an impact because plaintiffs in
a class action might refer to the admission in briefs or pleadings,
thus influencing the court not to dismiss the class action.197  James
Cox, a law professor at Duke University, predicted that the SEC
might be able to identify a limited number of cases in which com-
panies are more willing to admitting liability because they will not
face the threat of private litigation.198
Assistant Attorney General responsible for the subject matter or by the Associate Attorney
General, Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General.”).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See Jean Eaglesham & Chad Bray, Citi Ruling Could Chill SEC, Street Legal Pacts, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203935604577
066242448635560.html; see also Harry S. David et al., SEC Update:  Enforcement Program Tak-
ing Shape Under New Leadership, SCHULTE, ROTH & ZABEL (June 24, 2013), http://www.srz.
com/files/News/5852f231-62a7-43c0-adc2-116a7b9fde58/Presentation/NewsAttachment/af6433
ed-d31b-4187-b588-1cc51622f42b/062413_SEC_Update_Enforcement_Program_Taking_Shape_
Under_New_Leadership.pdf (noting that party admissions “may undercut the ability to defend
companion private securities litigation, including shareholder class action suits”).
196 Jean Eaglesham & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Seeks Admissions of Fault, WALL. ST. J.
(June 18, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324021104578
553931876196990.
197 See John C. Coffee, Jr., “Neither Admit Nor Deny”:  Practical Implications of SEC’s New
Policy, N.Y.L.J. (July 18, 2013) (“In the Southern District of New York, the majority of securi-
ties class actions are not dismissed on a motion to dismiss, and the chances of a dismissal on
either a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment will predictably decline markedly when the
defendant admits misconduct to the SEC in a prior proceeding.”).
198 Eaglesham & Ackerman, supra note 196.
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C. Settlement Agreements in the Aftermath of the SEC Policy
Change: Admissions of Wrongdoing
1. Philip Falcone’s Admission
The SEC’s first application of its new settlement policy oc-
curred in connection with the misconduct of an individual and his
company.199  On June 27, 2012, the SEC filed charges against Har-
binger Capital Partners (“Harbinger”), as well as the Chairman
and CEO of the company, Philip Falcone.200  The settlement re-
solved two civil lawsuits filed by the SEC against Falcone and Har-
binger,201 which alleged that Falcone had “fraudulent[ly] . . .
misappropriate[d] $113.2 million from a Harbinger fund in order to
pay a personal tax obligation,” and that Falcone and Harbinger had
“engaged in a scheme to grant certain large investors favorable re-
demption and liquidity terms.”202  The SEC had also alleged that
Harbinger had manipulated the bond prices of MAAX Holdings,
Inc.203
On August 19, 2013, the SEC entered into a settlement with
Falcone and Harbinger.204  As part of the settlement, Falcone
agreed to pay $6,507,574 in disgorgement, $1,013,140 in prejudg-
ment interest, and a $4 million penalty, while Harbinger was re-
quired to pay a penalty of $6.5 million.205  In addition, the
agreement barred Falcone from the securities industry for a mini-
mum of five years and required him to admit to acts of misconduct
that had harmed investors and the market.206
Specifically, Falcone admitted that he had improperly taken
out the $113 million loan from Harbinger to pay his own taxes at a
199 See Diana K. Lloyd & Jared M. Barnes, SEC Admissions Policy After Falcone—Proceed
With Caution, LAW 360 (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/473581/sec-admissions-
policy-after-falcone-proceed-with-caution.  For an overview of the SEC’s new policy, see supra
Part IV.B.
200 Our Team, HARBINGER GROUP, INC., available at http://www.harbingergroupinc.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=118763&p=irol-investmentteam.
201 Juliet Chung, Falcone Admits Wrongdoing, Agrees to Five-Year Ban, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19,
2013.
202 SEC v. Harbinger Capital Partners LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5028, 2012 WL 2402857 (S.D.N.Y.
June 27, 2012).
203 SEC v. Philip A. Falcone, No. 12 Civ. 5027 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012).




206 Id.  For a discussion of the SEC’s power to bar individuals from the securities industry, see
supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
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lower interest rate than Harbinger’s Special Situations Fund paid
to borrow money;207 that he had not informed investors about the
loan for approximately five months;208 and that he and Harbinger
had granted favorable redemption and liquidity terms to large in-
vestors without disclosing the arrangements to the board of direc-
tors and other investors.209  Falcone also admitted to purchasing all
outstanding bonds issued by a Canadian manufacturing company,
thus retaliating against a financial services firm after hearing ru-
mors that the firm was shorting the Canadian manufacturers’
bonds and urging its customers to do the same.210  As a result of
the improper “short squeeze,” Falcone admitted that the bonds
“more than doubled in price.”211
On September 16, 2013, Judge Paul A. Crotty in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York ap-
proved the settlement, calling it “a fair and appropriate resolution
of the[ ] two matters.”212
2. JPMorgan Chase “London Whale” Admission
In the second application of its new policy, the SEC secured an
admission from JPMorgan in connection with charges it filed
against the company for misstating its financial results and lacking
adequate internal controls over its trading activity.213
On April 6, 2012, the Wall Street Journal reported that a
London-based trader, nicknamed the “London Whale,” had
amassed an enormous position in a credit market on behalf of
JPMorgan’s New York-based chief investment office (“CIO”).214
One week later, JPMorgan’s chief executive officer, Jamie Dimon,
defended the CIO’s activity, calling concerns about the trading ac-





212 SEC v. Falcone, 12 Civ. 5027 (PAC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132300 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,
2013).
213 JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC
Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965#.UlLN8EKhDzI.
214 Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burn, “London Whale” Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577
326031119412436; see also Justin O’Brien & Olivia Dixon, The Common Link in Failures and
Scandals at the World’s Leading Banks, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 941, 946 (2013).
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tivity a “complete tempest in a teapot.”215  By May 10, 2012, how-
ever, total losses had exceeded $2 billion,216 and by July 13, 2012,
JPMorgan had lost more than $6 billion.217
On September 19, 2013, the SEC charged JPMorgan with im-
properly stating its financial results and failing to implement effec-
tive internal controls to guard against the fraudulent overvaluing of
investments, in violation of sections 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and
13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.218  The SEC also announced that
JPMorgan had agreed to settle the dispute by paying a $200 million
penalty to the SEC.219
Significantly, as part of the settlement, JPMorgan was re-
quired to admit the facts accompanying the SEC’s charges and to
publicly acknowledge that it had violated the federal securities
laws.220  JPMorgan admitted several facts, including that: (1) trad-
ing losses occurred amidst “woefully deficient accounting controls”
in the CIO; (2) senior management at JPMorgan had altered the
CIO’s policies for valuation control prior to the company’s filing its
first quarter report with the SEC in 2012 to remedy existing issues
with its policies; (3) JPMorgan senior management knew that the
Investment Banking unit used much more conservative prices in
valuing certain derivatives held in the CIO portfolio, and that if the
Investment Banking valuations were used, approximately $750 mil-
lion of additional losses would have occurred for the CIO in the
first quarter of 2012; (4) external traders with the CIO valued sev-
eral of the CIO’s positions in the CIO book at $500 million less
than CIO traders valued them, leading to “large collateral calls
against JPMorgan; (5) findings of internal reviews of the CIO
caused some executives to question whether they should sign sub-
certifications in support of certifications required under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act; and (6) senior management provided inade-
quate updates to the audit committee on important facts regarding
215 David Benoit, The London Whale: J.P. Morgan’s Statements through the Scandal, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/19/the-london-whale-j-p-mor-
gans-statements-through-the-scandal/.
216 Id.
217 O’Brien & Dixon, supra note 214, at 946.
218 JPMorgan Chase Agrees to Pay $200 Million and Admits Wrongdoing to Settle SEC
Charges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/
Detail/PressRelease/1370539819965#.UlLN8EKhDzI.
219 Id.
220 Id.  As part of the global settlement, JPMorgan also reached settlement agreements with
the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the U.K. Financial
Conduct Authority. Id.  In all, JPMorgan agreed to pay approximately $920 million in penalties
to the SEC and the other agencies.
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the CIO prior to filing the first quarter report, thus hindering the
ability of the committee to protect shareholders and ensure that
the firm’s financial statements were accurate.221
JPMorgan issued a press release on the day of the settlement,
stating that it had “cooperated extensively” with all inquiries.222  In
the press release, Mr. Dimon explained that JPMorgan has “ac-
cepted responsibility and acknowledged [its] mistakes from the
start,” although the press release did not contain JPMorgan’s spe-
cific admissions.223  On the day of the announcement, JPMorgan
shares closed at $52.75, having fallen 1.2 percent from the previous
day.224
In a statement released by the SEC, George Canellos, the Co-
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, explained that the
JPMorgan case was “about transparency and accountability, and
JPMorgan’s admissions [were] a key component in that mes-
sage.”225  Canellos noted that although the SEC will not seek ad-
missions in every case, it required an admission in this case because
JPMorgan had egregious issues with its internal controls, thus put-
ting its millions of shareholders at risk.226
On October 16, 2013, following JPMorgan’s settlement with
the SEC, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”) brought and settled charges against JPMorgan in con-
nection with the London Whale incident for improperly trading
credit default swaps.227  In settling with the CFTC, JPMorgan
221 Id.
222 JPMorgan Chase Reaches Settlements With SEC, FCA, OCC and Federal Reserve on CIO
Trading Matter, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://investor.shareholder.com/jp
morganchase/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=791729.
223 See id.
224 Kevin McCoy, JPMorgan Fined $920 Million for ‘London Whale’, USA TODAY (Sept. 19,
2013), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/19/jpmorgan-chase-
fined/2833725/.  Unless unexpected circumstances arise from the settlement, a dramatic change
in the price of JPMorgan shares is not expected. See id. (quoting Dan Marchon, Senior Equity
Research Associate at Raymond James & Co.).  Moreover, even though JPMorgan lost approxi-
mately $6 billion during the London Whale incident and must pay a penalty of approximately
$920 million to regulators, these losses “pale[ ]in comparison to J.P. Morgan’s profits of US$24
billion in its firm wide trading books”). See Claudia Zeisberger, Perspective:  The ‘London
Whale’, INSEAD KNOWLEDGE (Oct. 4, 2013), http://knowledge.insead.edu/business-finance/bank-
ing-insurance/perspective-the-london-whale-2867.
225 George Canellos, Statement on SEC Enforcement Action Against JPMorgan, U.S. SECURI-
TIES & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/Public
Stmt/1370539820148#.UlmmWEKhDzI.
226 Id.
227 CFTC Files and Settles Charges Against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., for Violating Prohi-
bition on Manipulative Conduct In Connection with “London Whale” Swaps Trades, U.S. COM-
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agreed to pay a penalty of $100 million, and the bank admitted to
engaging in a trading strategy to defend its position in the market
“in reckless disregard of the possible consequences of [its]
conduct.”228
Two former JPMorgan CIO traders, Javier Martin-Artajo and
Julien Grout, were indicted by a federal grand jury for allegedly
manipulating the bank’s trading position “in order to hide the true
extent of significant losses in that trading portfolio,”229 but the case
is ongoing.  Recently, New York Supreme Court Judge Jeffrey K.
Oing dismissed a shareholder derivative suit brought against
JPMorgan’s board of directors alleging a lack of oversight prior to
the London Whale $6 billion trading losses.230  Judge Oing dis-
missed the action because the plaintiffs did not succeed in showing
why they had been unable to voice their concerns to the board of
directors prior to filing the action.231
V. LESSONS LEARNED IN THE AFTERMATH OF
JUDGE RAKOFF’S DECISIONS AND THE FALCONE AND
JPMORGAN SETTLEMENTS
A. The Impact of Judge Rakoff’s Decisions
Judge Rakoff’s decisions in Citigroup and Bank of America
appear to have influenced other judges: in following his opinions, a
number of other district court judges have rejected or questioned
settlements the SEC has proposed.  In the event that Judge
Rakoff’s rulings result in district court judges’ employing a stricter
standard for approval of consent judgments, the SEC may face sub-
stantially greater costs in entering consent judgments with defend-
ants.232  Some lawyers predicted that if the court’s ruling in
MODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/Press
Releases/pr6737-13.
228 Id.
229 Sindhu Sundar, ‘London Whale’ Traders Indicted As JPMorgan Inks $800M Deal, LAW
360 (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/473137.




232 See M. Todd Henderson, Impact of the Rakoff Ruling: Was the Judge’s Scuttling of the
SEC/BofA Settlement Legally Pointless or Incredibly Important—or Both?, WALL ST. LAWYER 8
(Nov. 2009); see also Leen Al-Alami, Business Roundtable v. SEC:  Rising Judicial Mistrust and
the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 541, 544
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Citigroup is affirmed by the Second Circuit, it might lead to in-
creased liability for Wall Street firms, higher legal costs for corpo-
rations and federal agencies, and lengthier securities cases.233
However, if district courts were to analyze the SEC’s settlement
agreements more strictly, it is possible that the SEC will instead
bring more of its cases before an ALJ.234
There are two reasons that the more likely course that district
courts will follow is to give the same deference they have always
given to the SEC, except in cases in which it appears that the par-
ties are seeking to enter into a consent decree that seems com-
pletely contrary to the facts.  First, as mentioned above, the Second
Circuit will likely overturn the district court’s decision in Citigroup,
and if it does so, district court judges will be required to defer to
the SEC’s judgment. Second, since Judge Rakoff issued his opin-
ions the SEC has instituted its new admission policy.  Thus, be-
cause the SEC has not only adopted a policy whereby it will seek
admissions in egregious cases, but has already secured such admis-
sions in two cases, if the SEC chooses not to seek an admission in a
specific case, district court judges will be even more likely to defer
to the agency’s decisions because they will know that there was an
internal review process at the SEC and a decision was deliberately
made not to seek admissions.  Thus, courts will defer to the SEC
decisions much as they defer to other decisions by federal agencies
and prosecutors that are within their discretion, absent some indi-
cation that the decision was made for an improper purpose.235
(2013) (noting that Michael McConnell, a former judge on the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
projected that Judge Rakoff’s decision would “lead[ ] to impossibly costly litigation that would
prevent the SEC from pursuing many enforcement actions”); Naoufal, supra note 11, at 206
(“The SEC settles most of its cases by consent decrees, and creating a more stringent standard
can result in more costs and greater risks.”); Timothy P. Crudo & Newton Oldfather, SEC and




dmg (“If the SEC must spend more resources bringing fewer cases, defendants can expect the
price of settlement to rise . . . .”).
233 See Eaglesham & Bray, supra note 195.
234 See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
235 Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301 (1977) (recognizing that there is “a broad ambit
to prosecutorial discretion, most of which is not subject to judicial control”); see also Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (stating that
“federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by [agencies]”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that a court reviewing agency action “is not to substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency”).
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B. The SEC is Willing to Require Admissions from Individuals
and Large Corporations
Although to date the SEC has required admissions in only two
instances, these cases shed light on how the SEC might apply its
policy in the future.  Since Chair White instituted the SEC’s new
settlement policy on June 18, 2013, the SEC has demonstrated a
willingness to seek admissions of wrongdoing from large compa-
nies such as the “financial goliath” JPMorgan,236 rather than de-
manding accountability solely from smaller corporations.  In
securing an admission from JPMorgan in connection with the
London Whale incident, the SEC achieved several important goals.
First, because the admission was made by a high profile defendant,
the SEC increased its leverage with future companies in settlement
negotiations and “bolster[ed] public confidence for an agency long
criticized for being too soft on Wall Street.”237  Second, the admis-
sion was a significant “symbolic victory” for Mary Jo White and the
SEC that demonstrates that the SEC plans to carry out its promise
to seek admissions in particularly egregious cases, even if this prac-
tice might jeopardize defendants’ willingness to settle.238  Third, the
admission might have an effect on other companies in the industry
seeking to benchmark themselves against JPMorgan to ensure that
they have sufficient controls in place.239
236 See supra Part IV.C.2.
237 Dina ElBoghdady & Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan’s Admission:  A Symbolic Victory for
the SEC, of Limited Use in Private Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2013); see also Ken Sweet &
Marcy Gordon, JPMorgan’s $5 Billion Mortgage Deal Will Not End Its Troubles, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/26/jpmorgan-mortgage-deal-not-
end_n_4165936.html (noting that JPMorgan’s London Whale admission was “a first for a major
company”); Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Faces a Hard-Line SEC, WALL ST. J. (last updated
Sept. 19, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324807704579
084912809151456 (“The trading fiasco resulted in a hit to J.P. Morgan’s reputation as a stellar
risk manager, and gave a black eye to Mr. Dimon, who has been known for close attention to
details of the bank’s operation.  It also triggered the departures of top executives.”).
238 See ElBoghdady & Douglas, supra note 237 (“[The admission] represents a down payment
on (SEC Chairman) Mary Jo White’s promise to get more admissions.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Christopher Poe & David Smyth, JPMorgan Chase Admissions May
Be Less Than Meet the Eye, JDSUPRA (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/jpmor-
gan-chase-admissions-may-be-less-th-46060/ (discussing how the settlement shows the SEC is
committed to making this new approach work, and not just with easy cases and hapless
defendants”).
239 See ElBoghdady & Douglas, supra note 237.
696 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:665
Philip Falcone’s admissions also demonstrate that the SEC has
“shift[ed] course” to target individual misconduct.240  However, it
is equally clear that the SEC will not require in all cases that indi-
viduals admit wrongdoing even when it requires such admissions
by a corporation.  Thus, in JPMorgan’s London Whale settlement,
top banking officials at JPMorgan did not accept responsibility for
the harm caused to investors.241
Nonetheless, it is clear that the SEC will increasingly target
individuals to admit to wrongdoing.  Chair White recently stated
that the SEC plans to heighten its focus on individual misconduct
in seeking admissions.  At a speech to the Council of Institutional
Investors in Chicago, she explained that she wants to ensure that
the SEC is “looking first at the individual conduct and working out
to the entity, rather than starting with the entity as a whole and
working in.”242  She explained that this is “a subtle shift, but one
that could bring more individuals into enforcement cases.”243
Thus, it appears clear that the SEC will increasingly require admis-
sions from individual wrongdoers and not simply the corporations
that, often through lax supervision, enabled the individuals to com-
mit the wrongdoing without being discovered until the damage had
been done.
C. Collateral Consequences of Admissions: Will Not Likely be
the Deciding Factor for a Defendant in Determining
Whether to Admit Wrongdoing in Many Cases
One likely result of the SEC’s new policy is that some defend-
ants will be reluctant to make admissions because investors might
use their admissions in private lawsuits.244  Although an admission
in an SEC consent judgment may ultimately be inadmissible in a
subsequent civil trial, the admission may still have an impact be-
cause plaintiffs in a class action might refer to the admission in
240 Stuart Pfeifer, SEC Chief Says Enforcement Will Target Individuals’ Misconduct First,
L.A. Times, Sept. 26, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/26/business/la-fi-mo-
sec-must-target-individuals-as-well-as-companies-white-says-20130926.
241 See Ben Weyl, J.P. Morgan Not Completely Out of the Woods Yet, 2013 WL 75290063,
CONG. Q. ROLL CALL (Sept. 20, 2013) (stating that “[t]he settlements stopped short of assessing
blame against any top executives”).
242 Id.
243 Max Stendahl, SEC Head White Warns of Tougher Enforcement, LAW 360 (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/475946/sec-head-white-warns-of-tougher-enforcement.
244 Id.
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briefs or pleadings, thus influencing the court not to dismiss the
class action.245
Defendants, therefore, will undoubtedly need to consider
whether it is prudent to make admissions to the SEC due to the
potential costs resulting from private litigants or regulators who at-
tempt to use admissions from defendants in their own cases.246  If
making admissions proves too costly, defendants may become
more inclined to litigate rather than agree to settlements that in-
clude admissions, thus “straining S.E.C. resources and imperiling
the agency’s chance at a victory.”247
However, defendants who are usually represented by very ex-
perienced counsel in these matters will undoubtedly seek to struc-
ture their admissions to limit the collateral damage that could arise
from subsequent suits.  At least at this early stage of the SEC’s
implementation of its new policy, the SEC appears to be amenable
to this practice, as evidenced in the London Whale case.  JPMor-
gan’s admission may not be particularly useful for private plaintiffs
seeking to capitalize on the admission in subsequent lawsuits.248  In
connection with its admissions to the SEC in the London Whale
incident, JPMorgan took particular care to admit only to negli-
gence in its internal controls, and the bank did not admit to any
facts that could be used to prove that it intentionally misled its in-
245 Coffee, Jr., supra note 197 (“In the Southern District of New York, the majority of securi-
ties class actions are not dismissed on a motion to dismiss, and the chances of a dismissal on
either a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment will predictably decline markedly when the
defendant admits misconduct to the SEC in a prior proceeding.”).
246 See generally David Smyth, SEC Puts Some Color on Its New Admissions Policy, JD-
SUPRA (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-puts-some-color-on-its-new-ad-
mission-04242/ (“Falcone may have calculated that the follow-on costs from private lawsuits
trying to take advantage of the admissions in the filed consent are not high enough to continue
litigating this matter with the SEC.”); see also David et al., supra note 81 (stating that defendants
may be forced to choose between “accepting the harsh collateral consequences of admitted
wrongdoing or confronting the financial and reputational risk of protracted litigation with the
SEC”); Max Sendahl, Plaintiffs Attys Downplay SEC Shift on Settlements, Law 360 (Aug. 23,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/467367/plaintiffs-attys-downplay-sec-shift-on-settlements
(stating that defendants who admit wrongdoing “will have a harder time denying liability in the
civil context, and may even be prohibited from doing so”).
247 Alexandra Stevenson & Ben Protess, Legal Side Effect in Admission to S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at B3.
248 ElBoghdady & Douglas, supra note 237 (noting that many experts feel that the admission
was “a carefully crafted acknowledgment that’s unlikely to be used against JPMorgan in private
lawsuits or against its senior managers”); Peter J. Henning, In JPMorgan Settlement, Testing the
Lines of Admitting Wrongdoing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2013 (stating that the settlement was
“carefully structured to limit its potential fallout” and that it “will be of very limited utility to
private parties suing the bank for violating the federal securities laws”).
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vestors.249  In order to prevail in court, private plaintiffs would
likely need to prove fraud, and neither the settlement nor the ini-
tial allegations reference any fraud by the bank in misleading in-
vestors.250  Thus, although private plaintiffs would have standing to
sue under Rule 10b-5, JPMorgan’s admission will not likely ad-
vance these claims because the bank did not admit to making any
misstatements or omissions.251
In reaching a settlement, it is possible that the SEC did not
want to force an admission that could be used by subsequent plain-
tiffs in a 10b-5 action because future defendants would be reluctant
to enter into a settlement agreement containing admissions that
would hurt them in other lawsuits.252  In addition, undoubtedly the
SEC, in one of its first applications of its new policy, did not want
JPMorgan to take the case to trial simply because it refused to ad-
mit to certain allegations.  Moreover, it is not the SEC’s role to
attempt to obtain admissions solely to help private litigants in
ongoing or subsequent actions.
Another consequence for defendants who admit to wrongdo-
ing may be that they will face additional penalties from other regu-
latory agencies.  After admitting to misconduct, Falcone received
additional penalties from the New York Department of Financial
Services that resulted in a seven-year ban from exercising control
over Fidelity and other licensed insurance firms in New York.253
Falcone was also barred from serving as a director or officer of
Fidelity or a New York-licensed insurance firm during the seven-
year period.254
Some have speculated that the action by the New York De-
partment of Financial Service might “creat[e] a precedent that un-
249 See ElBoghdady & Douglas, supra note 237; Poe & Smyth, supra note 238 (“JPMorgan is
still admitting only to non-scienter-based charges under Sections 13(a) and 13(b)(2) of the Ex-
change Act.”).
250 Henning, supra note 248; see also Stephen Gandel, Did the SEC Let JPMorgan Off the
Hook?, CNNMONEY (Sept. 20, 2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/09/20/sec-jpmorgan-
london-whale/ (“JPMorgan doesn’t admit it tried to deceive anyone. Just that it missed some-
thing it should have.  In most civil lawsuits you have to prove fraud.  The SEC isn’t even alleging
fraud here.”).
251 Henning, supra note 248.
252 See Henning, supra note 248 and accompanying text.
253 Erik Larson, Falcone Banned at Fidelity for 7 Years by N.Y.’s Lawsky, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
8, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-07/falcone-banned-by-n-y-regulator-for-
seven-years.html.
254 Leslie Scism, Harbinger’s Philip Falcone Barred From Involvement With NY-licensed In-
surers—NY Regulator, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-
CO-20131007-706758.html.
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dermines” the SEC’s efforts to extract admissions from
wrongdoers following misconduct.255  If defendants are worried
that their admissions will be detrimental to their interests in other
proceedings, there may be a chilling effect on the willingness of
banks and hedge funds to make admissions to the SEC.256  How-
ever, given the importance of the SEC in the regulatory frame-
work, it seems unlikely that many defendants will refuse to make
admissions simply because they fear exposure to additional actions
by other regulators.
In fact, in the London Whale case, JPMorgan, in a subsequent
settlement with the CFTC, admitted to more egregious conduct
than it had in its settlement with the SEC, namely, that it had acted
recklessly in its trading strategy.257  Although such an admission
could potentially “carry a large price tag” by leading to increased
liability in shareholder litigation or exposure to criminal charges,
because “even a vague admission like ‘acting recklessly’” may be
beneficial to plaintiffs or regulators, JPMorgan was willing to make
the admissions.258
Moreover, JPMorgan still faces the prospect of more legal ac-
tions, including from the DOJ.259  Due to the uncertainty surround-
ing the DOJ’s response, if any, following admissions in cases in
which prior criminal charges had not been filed, attorneys have
been cautioned to consider carefully the implications of any admis-
sions to the SEC as part of settlement agreements.260  Although the
255 Alexandra Stevenson & Ben Protess, Legal Side Effect in Admission to S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at B3 (noting that Lawsky’s action “could cause headaches for the SEC”).
256 Id.
257 See text accompanying note 228.
258 Max Stendahl, CFTC Mimics SEC Policy Shift With JPMorgan “Whale” Pact, LAW 360
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/480686/cftc-mimics-sec-policy-shift-with-jpmor-
gan-whale-pact.
259 Evan Weinberger, JPMorgan Admits Guilt In $920M ‘London Whale’ Deal, LAW 360
(Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/473580/jpmorgan-admits-guilt-in-920m-london-
whale-deal.  Thus far, JPMorgan has not agreed to make an admission before the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, and it is unclear whether the Trading Commission will push the
bank to make an admission similar to the one it made in settling with the SEC. See Henning,
supra note 248.  If JPMorgan were to make a similar admission to the Trading Commission, it
“could open the bank up to substantial additional liability.” Id.
260 Lloyd & Barnes, supra note 243 (discussing how attorneys may benefit from engaging in
continued dialogue with the DOJ “to better calculate the risk involved before admitting to facts
that could form the basis of criminal liability”); see also Marc D. Powers et al., Baker & Hostetler
Discusses the Philip Falcone & Harbinger Capital Settlement, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept.
27, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2013/09/27/baker-hostetler-discusses-the-philip-fal-
cone-harbinger-capital-settlement/ (stating that “it should be clear to all regulated entities . . .
that SEC enforcement actions come with even greater risk and potential for deeper and more
far-reaching exposure”); Tone at the Top (of the SEC): Tough, DAVIS POLK (Oct. 7, 2013), http://
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DOJ might ultimately take action if it considers the conduct to be
egregious, it is also possible that the DOJ might decide not to be-
cause of “the possibility that the public would view a dual prosecu-
tion as overly harsh.”261
In addition, there are many reasons that defendants may not
want to take a case to trial.  First, if they lose, they may face even
larger fines than they would have had they settled.  Second, by pro-
ceeding to trial they necessarily expose themselves to additional
bad press both because the case will take longer to resolve and
because the evidence introduced at trial will be public.  Because
these cases will involve accusations of egregious conduct, defend-
ants will be even more likely to want to resolve the case through
settlement and put it behind them.
That being said, as the SEC increasingly seeks to require ad-
missions in more of its cases, there will undoubtedly be defendants
who determine that it is in their interests to go to trial rather than
admit to wrongdoing.  This will more likely be the case with indi-
viduals because they will not have quite the same concerns compa-
nies will have regarding ongoing bad press which will likely occur
in a protracted case.  Moreover, individuals do not always analyze
the likelihood of success after a trial as rationally as corporations.
In some cases, defendants will determine that the proof against
them is weak and that they have a good chance at prevailing at
trial.  In others, defendants may be unwilling to make certain ad-
missions the SEC might require due to the potential collateral con-
sequences.  Thus, the policy change will have important effects for
defendants and the SEC.  If the Commission employs an “overly
aggressive” approach to enforcing the policy, disputes may be re-
solved less efficiently.262  Defendants will likely have less of an in-
centive to settle if they cannot include the “neither admit nor
deny” language in settlement agreements,263 which may force the
www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/10.07.13.SEC_.pdf (“The SEC’s aggressive stance under
Chair White’s leadership portends a flurry of enforcement activity over the next several years.”).
261 Lloyd & Barnes, supra note 199.  Prior to entering the agreement with the SEC, however,
Falcone and Harbinger had not been subject to any criminal charges, and it is unclear whether
the DOJ is currently pursuing a criminal investigation of the matter. Id. (stating that “risk of
prosecution remains and only time will tell whether and how the DOJ will rely on admissions of
liability as a shortcut in their own investigations”).
262 Dan O’Connor et al., Admitting Guilt:  The SEC’s New Settlement Policy, ROPES & GRAY,
available at http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/261598/Securities/Admitting+Guilt+The+
SECs+New+Settlement+Policy (last updated Sept. 9, 2013).
263 Bradley Bondi, The SEC’s New Policy on Seeking Admissions in Settlements, JDSUPRA
(July 1, 2013) (Excluding the ‘neither admit nor deny’ language from settlements will lower
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SEC to take these cases to trial.264  Thus, the SEC risks losing mat-
ters at trial that it might have settled prior to the policy change,265
which would jeopardize any potential recovery by victims of the
misconduct.266
D. Long-Term Implications of the New Admission Policy
The policy change may also result in less thorough, or fewer,
investigations as the SEC shifts resources towards preparing for
trial.267  As Professor John Coffee, an expert on securities laws sug-
gests, the SEC may benefit from bringing fewer cases in order to
increase its focus on the cases it does bring.268  Perhaps the SEC’s
new direction is unsurprising given Mary Jo White’s background as
a prosecutor.  It is interesting to note that none of the previous five
Chairs shared Ms. White’s prosecutorial background prior to being
appointed as Chair.269  Ms. White has made clear that the SEC
significantly the incentive of registrants to settle, possibly requiring the SEC to litigate more
cases.”).
264 O’Connor et al., supra note 262.
265 Id.; Marc H. Axelbaum, Admit It! SEC May Seek Admissions of Wrongdoing in Settle-
ments, PILLSBURY WINTHROP (June 25, 2013), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publica-
tions/Alert20130625LitigationAdmitItSECMaySeekAdmissionsofWrongdoingInSettlements.pdf
(stating that enforcement lawyers may be concerned about “the risk of losing a high-profile
trial”).
266 Coffee, Jr., supra note 197 (noting that settlements allow for victims to be compensated
more quickly).
267 Id.; see also Max Stendahl, SEC’s Courtroom Cred Slips as Trial Losses Mount, LAW 360
(December 4, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/493461/sec-s-courtroom-cred-slips-as-trial-
losses-mount (stating that more trials could place the “cash-strapped [SEC] in a bind”).
268 John C. Coffee, Jr., The End of Phony Deterrence? ‘SEC v. Bank of America’, N.Y.L.J.
(2009).
269 See generally SEC Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm (last modified Aug. 15,
2013). Former Chairman Mary L. Shapiro, appointed on January 20, 2009, served as the CEO of
FINRA and as Chairman of the CFTC prior to becoming SEC Chairman, but does not have a
prosecutorial background.  See SEC Biography: Chairman Mary L. Shapiro, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/schapiro.htm (last modified Dec. 11, 2012).
Christopher Cox, who was appointed as Chairman on June 2, 2005, worked for Congress, the
White House, and in private practice prior to joining the SEC. See SEC Biography:  Chairman
Christopher Cox, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/cox.htm
(last modified Feb. 4, 2009).  Former Chairmen William H. Donaldson, who was appointed on
February 18, 2003, and Harvey L. Pitt, who was appointed on August 3, 2001, also did not pos-
sess prosecutorial backgrounds prior to becoming Chairmen. See SEC Biography:  Chairman
William H. Donaldson, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/
donaldson.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2009) (noting that Mr. Donaldson “arrived at the Commis-
sion with more than 45 years of experience working at the highest levels of business, government
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plans to take more of its cases to trial in light of its aggressive en-
forcement strategy since her appointment.270  As a result, there will
be “greater public accountability.”271
Moreover, when the SEC’s policy change went into effect, sev-
eral of Mary Jo White’s top attorneys at the SEC were former pros-
ecutors from the Southern District of New York who had
substantial experience with exercising prosecutorial discretion.272
Both George Canellos and Andrew Ceresney, co-directors of the
SEC’s Enforcement Division early on during Chair White’s tenure,
and Robert Rice, Chief Counsel, served as Assistant U.S. Attor-
neys in the United States Attorney’s Office and held various super-
visory positions.273  Federal prosecutors, especially in New York,
have brought securities cases against both individuals and compa-
nies and have had a tremendous amount of experience in using
their broad discretion to determine what the right outcome should
be based on the facts of the case.  In addition, they have tried many
securities cases, obtaining convictions in most.  Now that the SEC
has established a new category of admissions, the personnel are in
place to ensure that the new policy will be implemented in a careful
and deliberate manner.  Chair White and the team she has assem-
bled at the SEC have a great deal of experience supervising other
lawyers on important trials.  This will be important as the SEC
and academia.”); SEC Biography:  Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://
www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/pitt.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2009) (stating that Mr. Pitt
worked in private practice and in various roles with the SEC, such as General Counsel, prior to
joining the SEC as Chairman).  Arthur Levitt, who served two terms as Chairman, did not obtain
a law degree prior to serving as Chairman. See SEC Biography:  Chairman Arthur Levitt, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/levitt.htm (last modified Jan. 23,
2009)  (stating that Mr. Levitt owned a newspaper, served as Chairman of the New York City
Economic Development Corporation, and was Chairman of the American Stock Exchange prior
to being appointed as Chairman of the SEC).
270 Daniel Wilson, SEC’s White Says More Trials in Agency’s Future, LAW 360 (Nov. 14,
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/488532/sec-s-white-says-more-trials-in-agency-s-future.
271 Stendahl, supra note 267.
272 See George Canellos and Andrew Ceresney Named Co-Directors of Enforcement, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRe-
lease/1365171514832#.UtB9YUKhDzI.
273 Both George Canellos and Andrew Ceresney, co-directors of the SEC’s Enforcement Di-
vision early on during Chair White’s tenure, and Robert Rice, Chief Counsel, served as Assistant
U.S. Attorneys in the United States Attorney’s Office and held various supervisory positions.
George Canellos and Andrew Ceresney Named Co-Directors of Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/13651715
14832#.UtB9YUKhDzI. Robert E. Rice Named As Chief Counsel to SEC Chair, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n (June 3, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365
171575118#.UtB_KEKhDzI.
2014] THE SEC ADDS A NEW WEAPON 703
transitions to an agency that conducts more trials as a result of its
new policy on admissions.
In implementing the new policy, Chair White sought not only
to seek a just result against those whose conduct is egregious, but
also to deter companies and individuals from committing future
acts of misconduct.  The policy will likely increase deterrence be-
cause there is now a greater “penalty” if the actions rise to the level
where the SEC will require an admission of wrongdoing.  The new
admission policy will likely usher in a new era at the SEC as it will
ensure that companies and individuals whose conduct is egregious
admit to wrongdoing or take the case to trial.  They can no longer
simply settle a case, implement some changes and pay a fine with-
out admitting that they did something wrong.  This will lead to a
more just resolution of cases.  This may also help the vast majority
of companies and individuals who neither admit nor deny wrong-
doing.  Because some cases will require admissions, the conduct in-
volved in the other cases may be viewed as purely negligent and
therefore the implications for the company or individuals will be
that the public will not perceive them as having done anything
egregious.  The new policy will likely increase deterrence because
there is now a greater “penalty” if the company’s or individual’s
actions rise to the level where the SEC will require an admission of
wrongdoing.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the recent policy change altering the SEC’s stance to-
ward admissions in settlement agreements, the SEC has sought to
send a stronger deterrent message to companies.274  Some com-
mentators predicted that the SEC’s new policy would be used spar-
ingly in cases involving defendants who are nearly bankrupt or had
been previous subjects of failed criminal proceedings.275  However,
the admissions by Falcone and JPMorgan suggest that the SEC’s
new policy requiring defendants to make admissions in particularly
egregious cases might be applied more broadly than initially antici-
274 See Michaels, supra note 179 (stating that the SEC is “trying to get as strong a deterrent
message out there as [possible]” (quoting Chair White)); (“Defendants are going to have to own
up to their conduct on the public record[.] . . . This will help with deterrence, and it’s a matter of
strengthening our hand in terms of enforcement.” (quoting Chair White)).
275 Id.
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pated.276  Chair White has clearly set the SEC on a path towards
holding both individuals and corporations more accountable for
their actions.  Both through the SEC’s actions and her recent state-
ment indicating that the SEC will seek more admissions in the fu-
ture while focusing increasingly on individuals, Chair White has
made clear that the Falcone and JPMorgan cases were not simply
an effort to placate judges or elected officials.
In the aftermath of the SEC’s policy changes to its “no admit,
no deny” settlement practices, the SEC appears to have addressed
several of Judge Rakoff’s concerns regarding its willingness to de-
mand accountability from defendants when entering into settle-
ments.277  When the SEC altered its settlement policy, many
believed that it would have difficulty securing admissions because
defendants can refuse to do so in favor of litigating their disputes at
trial.278  While defendants do retain the option to forego settlement
and go to trial, the recent admissions secured by the SEC demon-
strate that some defendants are willing to admit wrongdoing as
part of settlement agreements in lieu of going to trial, because they
have concluded that it is in their interest to do so.  The recent
changes to the SEC’s settlement practices suggest that the SEC has
altered its focus in an attempt to strengthen its law enforcement
program and provide for increased deterrence of companies and
individuals.
276 Id. (“[T]he recent settlement . . . suggests a potentially broader application of the
policy.”).
277 For an overview of Judge Rakoff’s concerns, see supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2.
278 See supra notes 246–247 and accompanying text.
